MISUSING MATHEMATICS

I have heard people say, "I had to call with a lousy hand because I was getting 5 to 1 on my money," not taking into account that they were up against five opponents with better hands than they had. For example, if you hold SV 2V in hold em, it might be right to call against one player if a lot of extra money was magically added to the pot. Against five players, however, you may lose with a small (lush to a bigger (lush or make two pair and be up against three Fives. There are more ways to lose when you are up against more hands.

Players sometimes say they called because of the implied odds, which takes into account action they were going to get if they made their hand. Often, they had no reason to expect they were going to get that kind of ac­tion. Also, they don't take into account that if they made the hand, it still might not end up being the winner. It is usually right to fold if it was® borderline decision even after accounting for the implied odds. I lowever.

when you analyze the situation, you sometimes realize that your opponent probably isn't going to be able to call your raise when you make the hand. If you come to the conclusion that he may be too weak to call a raise even now, then you should raise with your draw as a back-up way of winning the hand.

When players get beat with the best hand, they sometimes spout math­ematical nonsense about how big a favorite they were. For example, when they lose with Ace-King against King-Jack in hold'em, you may hear them complain that they got beat by a three-outer and were a 45 to 3 favorite. In reality, they were between a 2.3 to I favorite and a 3.1 to 1 favorite, depending on the suits.

Story 1: In 1992, I was playing in the best S75-S 1 50 hold'em game in which I had ever played. One player was playing like such a maniac that he raised before the (lop every time it was his turn. If it was two bets to him, he made it three bets. If it was three bets to him, he made it four bets, which was the cap. After a few rounds, the other players knew not to raise with their good hands. They would limp in, try to trap a few callers, and wait for the maniac's raise and then they would reraise. A well-known poker writer was sitting to the maniacs right. For seven consecutive rounds, the poker writer called in the small blind only to be knocked out before the flop when the maniac raised and some other player reraised. The maniac went broke after the seventh round of this, so I don't know how long this would have gone on. I was surprised that the poker writer, a supposedly winning player, had so little table feel. He must have played using strictly memorized guidelines. He would look at his hand, let's say 10V 4V or 04 84, and after consulting his mental chart, he would decide that the hand was worth a call in the small blind. Then, when it came back to him, he would decide the hand did not qualify for two more bets.

Story 2: In 1975, while 1 was attending college, I played dealer's choice with college students, locals, and a philosophy professor. The minimum buy-in was $20, but towards the end of the night, players would typically have a couple of hundred in front of them. One night, the professor and I had been killing the game, and we each had around $3000 in front of us.

The current game was pot-limit, seven-card stud hi-lo. I raised the bring-in $7, making the pot S28 after two of the other six players called on third street. A bet of $28 on fourth street got the pot down to heads- iip between the professor and me. The pot was now $84. 1 bet $84 on fifth street and the professor called, making the pot $252. He bet $252 on sixth street. I hesitated and then called. On the river, he bet $750 and I raised the rest of his chips.